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LETTER

TO A

MEMBER

OF THE HONOURABLE

HOUSE of COMMONS,

ON THE

PRESENT IMPORTANT CRISIS

OF

NATIONAL AFFAIRS.

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LETTER

TO A

FRIEND

OF THE OPPOSITION,

ON THE

PRESENT IMPORTANT CRISIS

OF

NATIONAL AFFAIRS.

LONDON:

SIR,

THE freedom of debate and the liberty of the preſs, have been the methods generally made uſe of to convey our ſentiments to the public. Jealous ought Engliſhmen to be of their prerogative; jealous ought every man to be of the liberty of the preſs: for, as the whole ſhould be concerned for the preſervation of every individual, ſo it is the duty of every individual to be concerned for the whole in which himſelf is included.—This ſhort preamble, I hope, will be conſidered as a ſufficient apology, for intruding upon your leiſure the following ſheets.

THE government of Great Britain is, if I may be allowed the expreſſion, a royal republic. The executive branch is entruſted with the King, the head of the common wealth. The laws are recommended to him by his parliament, and executed by the ſeveral miniſters of juſtice. All directionary acts of ſtate are preſumed to be done by the advice of his privy council, who are unanſwerable for the advice they give. The prerogatives of the crown are various and extenſive: and the

chief among them is, that the King names, creates, conſtitutes, and removes all the great officers of the government. It is the peculiar happineſs of the Kings of Great Britain, that the laws are their ſure ſafe guards; and that while they act agreeably to the conſtitution, their ſecurity is undoubted. They have none to be fearful of but their flatterers; and miſleading ſycophants, who will be as wicked as they are mean for the advancing of their own intereſts. A ſovereign of Britain is not, by our conſtitution to perform any high acts of power, but by and with the advice of his privy council. Hence ariſes his ſacredneſs of character, and the ſafety of the royal perſon. A King can do no wrong, becauſe he acts only by the advice of his counſellors. So that if wrong acts are done by him in his regal capacity, they are ſuppoſed to have been influenced by the advices of evil counſellors, and thoſe counſellors are to be anſwerable to the nation for ſuch proceedings. In matters of government, he is therefore to have no favourites; he muſt be adviſed by his council, and with his council he muſt act. His very orders of power are not valid, or ſafely executable, without a counter-ſignature by an officer of ſtate, who is known to be a member of the privy council, and whoſe ſignature is conſidered as authoritative from them; becauſe without ſuch authority, the ſigner muſt be anſwerable for the conſequences of his act. Thus are we guard-

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ed, by our conſtitution, againſt favourites in acts of power: and the ſovereign's own ſecurity depends on his not acting intirely of himſelf. A *premier*, therefore, or ſole miniſter, is not ſufferable in this kingdom; and is a power that has never been exerciſed with ſafety to the ſovereign, or but with abhorrance of the people; yet, from ſome unaccountable fatality, it is been a misfortune to mankind, that many of the European princes have been, for ſome centuries, governed by favourites; 'even the turbulent ſpirit of Henry VIII. was 'long bound in miniſterial fetters.' Sir Nathaniel Bacon, in his diſcourſe on the government of England, (pag. 201) makes the following reflection on the ſtate of the council in that reign; "the firſt heat of his courſe "was run well, ſo long as the privy council "continued moderately poiſed: but no ſooner began one of them to put up beyond his "place, and to bid adieu to the advice of all "the reſt, but he gets the uppermoſt part in "the King's heart, and then it's two to one "that the people in ſuch caſes muſt bear the "greater burden; for whoever firſt ſaid it, "he ſaid moſt true, that *prerogative in the "hand of a King is a ſceptre of gold, but in "the hand of a ſubject it is a rod of iron.*"

The miſeries and miſchiefs that Henry the fourth of France was involved in by the ambition of his miſtreſſes, are ſuch leſſons of inſtruction as ſhould be precious to princes.

The ſame may be ſaid of the weakneſs o King James the firſt of England, with regard to his favourites. They were cotemporary princes; and both owed great unhappineſſes to thoſe whom they favoured, even to the exceſſes of unmanly weakneſs; and they have been even ſuſpected alſo to owe their deaths to them; as their ſubjects reſpectively did many great evils and calamaties. Moſt Engliſhmen have read of Somerſet, the favourite of James the firſt; that he was born in an obſcure corcorner of the pooreſt part of Great Britain; that after having acquired a few faſhionable accompliſhments by travel, he roſe, to the ſcandal of the nation, to the moſt ſurpriſing height of power, without family connexions to ſupport him. His ſole recommendation to the royal favour was derived from his perſon, his air, his mein, and inſinuating addreſs. Theſe were looked upon, in that unfortunate reign as ſufficient talents to entitle him to the abſolute goverment of three kingdoms. Notwithſtanding he was deſtitute of every qualification, that ſo great a degree of power ſeemed to require, he wanted not the art of uſing proper means to preſerve himſelf in it: he was officious in ſerving every body; he diſguiſed his partiality to his own neceſſitous countrymen. And accordingly we find, that that many of the higheſt rank, far from ſhewing their diſguſt at the ſudden elevation of the favourite, ſubmitted to bow down in the temple

gle of Rimmon, to ſupport the weight of their ſupine lord, and prop the ſteps and ruining credit of their corrupt patron.

How oppoſite is this to the conduct of Queen Elizabeth; ſhe would be miſtreſs of her own conduct, as Burleigh found to his great trouble, Leiceſter to his frequent mortification, and Eſſex experienced to his ruin: and by aſſerting her own dignity, and maintaining her full authority, ſhe ſecured ſo much happineſs and proſperity to her people, while ſhe acquired ſo much reſpect from foreign ſtates, that ſhe fixed thereon her own high felicity in life, and her own immortality of renown. With what pleaſure do we turn to that ever memorable page, which diſplays the vigilant and active ſpirit, the comprehenſive genius of ſecretary Walſingham; ſufficient alone to diſcover the dangerous deſigns of the Spaniſh court, to deſtroy its greateſt armaments, to ſilence the voice of faction at home, to extend the Engliſh power, and eſtabliſh its glory!—Elizabeth ſaw the neceſſity of entruſting the care of her people, not with ſuch of her ſervants as her fancy had choſen, but ſuch as her judgment and experience approved of: her councils were guided by Cecil and Walſingham, and under her government a true Engliſh ſpirit was diſplayed, and the power of her kingdom was tremendous: She was feared abroad, and reſpected at home.

Out of her hiſtory I have copied the following paſſage and ſpeech. " Great complaints " were made in the lower houſe relating to " the engroſſing practice:" (for it ſeems there were ſome, who, under colour of the public good, but in reality to the great damage of the kingdom, had got the Queen's letters patents, for the ſole privilege and liberty of vending ſome particular wares) " The Queen, there- " fore to foreſtall them, publiſhed a procla- " mation, declaring thoſe grants to be null and " void; and alſo left them to be tried at com- " mon law; a method which was ſo accep- " table to the lower houſe, that eighty of that " body were appointed to wait on her Ma- " jeſty with their humble thanks, which the " ſpeaker was to preſent in the name of them " all. She received them very graciouſly, and " gave her anſwer in the following ſpeech:

" Gentlemen,

" I owe you my beſt thanks and acknow- " ledgments for your reſpect towards me; not " only for your good inclination, but thoſe " *clear* and *public expreſſions* thereof, which " have diſcovered themſelves in *retrieving* me " from a *miſtake* into which I have been *be-* " *trayed*; not ſo much by the faults of my " own will, as the error of my judgment. " This had unavoidably drawn a *blemiſh* upon " me, (who account the ſafety of my people " my chief happineſs) had *you* not made me

" acquainted

" acquainted with the *practice* of theſe *lewd*
" *harpies* and *horſe-leeches*. I would ſooner
" loſe my heart or hand, than ever conſent to
" allow ſuch privilege to engroſſers, as may
" turn to the detriment of my people. I am
" not ſo blinded with the luſtre of a crown,
" as to let the ſcale of juſtice be weighed down
" by that of an arbitrary power. The gay
" title of a Prince may deceive ſuch as know
" nothing of the ſecret of governing; as a
" gilded pill may impoſe on the patient: but I
" am not one of thoſe unwary princes; for I
" am ſenſible that I ought to govern for the
" public good, and not to regard my own par-
" ticular; and that I ſtand accountable to an-
" other, a greater tribunal. I account myſelf,
" that by God's aſſiſtance I have enjoyed ſo
" proſperous a government in all reſpects; and
" that he hath bleſſed me with ſuch ſubjects,
" for whom I could be contented to lay down
" my crown and life. I muſt entreat you,
" that let *others* be *guilty* of what *faults* and
" *miſdemeaners* ſoever, they may not, through
" any miſrepreſentation, be laid at *my* door. I
" hope the evidence of a good conſcience will
" in all reſpects bear me out. You cannot be
" ignorant, that the ſervants of Princes have
" too often an eye to their *own* advantage; that
" their faults are often *concealed* from their no-
" tice; and that they cannot, if they would,
" inſpect all things, when the weight and bu-

" ſineſs

" ſineſs of a whole nation lies upon their " ſhoulders."

Here is a ſpeech (ſays the excellent author of Cato's letters) worthy of the occaſion, worthy of a wiſe Prince, worthy of a free people; a ſpeech that has truth, and ſenſe, and ſpirit in it. We may be ſure from the frankneſs and vigour of it, that the miniſters who adviſed it were no ſharers in the guilt of which it complains: if they had, they would have choſen words more faint and equivocal; they would have ſhuffled in their aſſertions; they would have talked more cowardly; they would have kept off ſome particulars; they could not have hid their guilt and fears: but here this boldneſs is the effect of their innocence, and prompted by it. Her Majeſty frankly owns that ſhe has been *drawn* into error; but that it was only an error of her judgment, ſhe makes manifeſt by her alacrity and forwardneſs to puniſh thoſe *harpies* and *horſe-leeches*, who in her name had abuſed the public: ſhe owns it juſt that thoſe engroſſers ſhould *ſuffer*: ſhe owns that the art and end of reigning is to advance the public good; and when that end is not attained, ſhe conſigns to puniſhment thoſe rooks and traytors, through whoſe fault it is not attained. She owns ſhe has been abuſed by her ſervants; who under authority, and in the name of the law, had ſought their *own vile advantages*; and ſhe removes from herſelf all guilt by *giving up* the guilty. Happy Queen!

happy

happy in her own qualifications; happy in thoſe of her counſellors: but wiſe and good as ſhe was, ſhe could not have talked thus *if her miniſtry had been weak or wicked:* had this been her *misfortune*, in ſpite of her ſincerity, wiſdom and reſolution, her ſpeech would have been falſe, faint and ſilly. But her counſellors were able and faithful, and made England powerful.

This has entailed bleſſings upon her memory, and praiſe upon that of her counſellors; and indeed the happineſs or miſery of a people will always be the certain meaſure of the glory or infamy of their rulers, whenever ſuch happineſs or miſery is evidently deducible from their management.

It is not wiſe in Princes to indulge favourites, nor ſafe for them to rely too much on their councils; ſince few inſtances can be produced of their conſtant impartiality and rectitude. They may be pleaſed, as companions, with thoſe whom it may be improper for them to make adviſers; and they ſhould be ever jealous of ſuch as ſeek to engroſs their confidence, or monopolize their favour. Kings have no fortunes, nor can have any rivals in authority, therefore are not actuated by thoſe principles that influence the conduct of ſuch as are candidates for their favour. Their higheſt intereſt lies in acting well and to public ſatisfaction. They ſhould therefore make great uſe of their own judgments, becauſe no other can be expected to be ſo diſintereſted and im-

partial; ſo that while they act by the counſels of many, they ſhould avoid thoſe of mere individuals.

What has been ſaid is only an attempt to prove the neceſſity of ſovereign independency, for the right adminiſtration of government; no factious purpoſes are intended to be laid or promoted by it; no deſign to undermine any man. —The examples and the reaſonings are fair and general; and further let it be obſerved, that true virtue is not to be wounded by inſinuation, ſhould any be invidious enough to form applications; nor is a right influence to be weakened by expoſing that which is wrong. To diſcuſs any point fairly, however intereſting it may be to both King and people, is a privilege which Engliſhmen *yet* enjoy, and I am by no means for abuſing it.

To theſe ſentiments will naturally follow ſome others concerning the liberty of the preſs. —Every rational man, who has the leaſt ſpark of virtue or love for his country, muſt conſider the many attacks, the many ſhocks it has of late ſuffered, as ſo many *artful* ſchemes to undermine and deſtroy this ſtrong barrier of the liberties of our country. Men who aim at tyrannical domination, wiſh we were depreſſed to a ſtate of contemptible ſlavery, that they might then, with abſolute power, purſue uncontrouled their *own* crafty deſigns. It is this liberty, by which any one may give the whole

people,

people, who are naturally apt to be too indolent, a knowledge of ſuch meaſures, and excite in them a noble ſpirit of ſelf-defence; and it is this which ſtrikes terror into the hearts of tyrants, and frequently checks their inſolence.—It is true a man *may* write a book, which relates to the government or conduct of a miniſter, and he *may* publiſh it; but then he is liable to be proſecuted and harraſſed both in his pocket and perſon, let his intention and writings be ever ſo innocent; for as theſe proſecutions are carried on in the King's name, whoſe prerogative exempts him from paying coſts in any caſe, a man may be put to very great expences and vexation, by warrants, ſeizures, examinations, commitments, bail, appearances and trials, without any remedy, though his caſe ſhould appear ever ſo hard, and the jury acquit him in the moſt honourable manner. But if a verdict ſhould happen to be found againſt him, he is then to expect no favour; and any miniſter hath the advantage of a writer in this reſpect; for the leaſt ſlip or inadvertency of expreſſion may be explained and aggravated by his writers and lawyers into a moſt enormous offence; or if a writer ſhould guard himſelf ſo well in theſe points, as to give his enemies no handle againſt him in the firſt plain import of his words, they may be turned into different meanings by the help of inuendos, forced conſtructions and applications, and arbitrarily fixed upon him as his own.

It is well worthy remark in this place, what Camden tells us, anno 1581, that Stubbs of Lincoln's-Inn, and Page his publiſher, were proſecuted on a doubtful ſtatute for writing and diſperſing a book againſt Queen Elizabeth's intended marriage with Francis, Duke of Anjou, (whom in reality ſhe wiſhed to marry) and were contented to ſuffer the penalties of that moſt rigorous ſtatute, whereby they had their right hands cut off with a cleaver driven through the wriſt by the force of a mallet, upon a ſcaffold in the market-place at Weſtminſter. Dalton, who was counſel againſt this prodigious proſecution, was ſent to the Tower for defending his client; and Monſon, a Judge of the Common-Pleas, ſo ſeverely reprehended, for not being a thorough-pace conformiſt to the judgment, that Cambden ſays, he thought fit to reſign. The hiſtorian himſelf was preſent at the execution of this ſentence, and relates it in theſe words: "I remember that Stubbs, when "he loſt his right hand, the multitude ſtand-"ing about him were deeply ſilent, either out "of horror of this puniſhment, or elſe out of "commiſeration towards the man, as being of "honeſt and unblameable repute, or elſe out "of hatred of the marriage, which moſt men "preſaged would be the overthrow of the pro-"teſttant religion."

Others have likewiſe ſuffered for *daring* to be *honeſt*, and ſpeaking that which was true, and which could not be effaced by puniſhments of

any

any kind. But what does poſterity ſay of ſuch perſecutors? Does it not brand them as men poſſeſſed of every wicked principle, as baſe in their natures, as malicious, tyrannonus, and guilty of crimes, the expoſing of which they could not withſtand? Then do ſuch puniſhments purify their characters or render them *more* infamous? beſides keeping alive the charge from which they attempted to clear themſelves.

Now we will change the ſubject, and proceed to another, more national and more important.

WE have UNANIMITY continually recommended to us, by thoſe who at the ſame time reproach us with inconſtancy; and we are continually told we are the happieſt people upon earth; alſo, at ſome times, that we are the wiſeſt, and at others, that we are the fooliſheſt in the world: all of which ſeems to be the cant of deſigning men, who ſeek to promote or preſerve their own intereſts.

I would fain know what it is thoſe gentlemen mean by unanimity. Whether it is, that we ſhould be unanimouſly implicit in the practice of obedience to power, whether right or wrong, or weakly or wiſely exerciſed? Or whether we ſhould be unanimous in forgetting to ſee, hear, feel, or underſtand? For I think ſome one or all of theſe things ſeem to have an implied recommendation in this repeated admonition: which is no other than the perſuading

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us to become tame, docile, fooliſh and inſenſible creatures. Unanimity can be only expected from a conviction of right conduct. We ought not to be unanimouſly fools for the advantage of particular men; nor unanimouſly reſolve to become ſlaves for the gratifying of ambition.

A writer * who made his appearance the other day, recommends a coalition between Lord B. and Mr. Pitt, as the only means of uniting the whole people, who, as he *ſuppoſes*, have eſpouſed the ſides of one or the other of thoſe great men. He defines their material difference to have aroſe in the council, when Mr. Pitt urged the neceſſity of a war with Spain, which the noble lord and the King's ſervants oppoſed. If we believe this writer, both Mr. P. and lord B. had the ſame point in view, viz. that of making a peace; but were for purſuing different means to attain it. Mr. Pitt wanted to purſue the war with his accuſtomed vigour, until Spain, as well as France, were ſo humbled, as to agree to ſuch terms as ſhould be to the advantage of England, adequate to the expence of the war, and eſtabliſh her future ſecurity. The noble lord *could not* ſee at that time, that Spain intended to break with us; he had not ſuch an acute diſcernment; therefore he did (as he does ſtill) incline to the making of peace. If a coalition, ſays the ſame author, was effected between theſe

* Analyſis of the war.

theſe two great men, their partizans would coalize alſo, and a peace might be made that would give univerſal ſatisfaction: that is, he means, the people would univerſally approve of it, becauſe their leaders did. But I believe he is here miſtaken; the people will never approve of a bad peace, let who will change ſides, or veer about with parties: for it is meaſures, and *not* men, that they will regard: it is to their own common intereſt, and *not* to individuals, that they are attached. Can it *be* ſuppoſed, that a *whole* people are ſo blind or bigotted in their eſteem for any one, as not to perceive when their common good is *rightly* purſued, but implicitly follow him in whatever ſteps he ſhall be compelled to take, or to whatever ſide he may be drawn? The people of England are not ſo docile, nor have they in ſo *wiſhed-for* a manner loſt *all* ſenſe of their own intereſt, nor *all* regard for its preſervation. When they ſee that thoſe in whom they placed unlimited confidence, deſert their intereſt and their cauſe, they will ceaſe to be their ſupporters. Let any one go into the city, and he may obſerve dejection in every countenance: the people deſpair of having a good peace, becauſe they think this an improper time for making one: Newfoundland † is yet in the hands of the enemy. I will not aſſign the cauſes

† The loſs of part of the iſland of Newfoundland, brings to my remembrance the loſs of Minorca, which rouſed

cauſes for its being ſo long in the enemies poſſeſſion; but if a fleet *had* been ſent from England as ſoon as the advice came of the French being there, I believe they would not have been there now: why this ſtep was not *immediately* taken is a myſtery much eaſier to be conceived than unravelled. This is one reaſon why the people think peace improper at this time. Another is, Louiſana is in the hands of the French, notwithſtanding it might according to all accounts, have been taken long ago, and with a ſmall force; and general Amherſt

rouſed the ſpirit of the people; who impatient of ſuch injuries, ſuch ſufferings, and ſuch diſgrace, clamoured, as it were with one voice, for juſtice, for vengeance! till faction became terrified into compounding for ſafety with power and employments, while an innocent ſcape-goat became ſacrificed as a ſin offering for the guilty.

The ſpirit of a people then forced a man into the cabinet, who had been an oppoſer of the miniſtry, and by their inſinuations made perſonally odious to the ſovereign himſelf. But neceſſity became the compeller of recourſe to his abilities. The helm was placed in his hand: and, by his vigilance and ſkill, the bark of ſtate was conducted through tempeſts and ſhoals, to the ſmooth ocean of poſterity; and we ſaw the haven of ſecurity fairly opening to our full view. This was the happy ſtate of Britain, when infatuation induced her to receive the demon of diſſention that was ſent to her by her foes. He has conjured our hemiſphere again into a lowering appearance. New ſtorms are now foreſeen and new dangers are apprehended. We feel ourſelves all greatly diſquieted, and fear the fatal ſhipwreck of all the higheſt of our intereſts. The whole nation placed full confidence in the *late* miniſtry, and relied on their ſpirit and integrity for obtaining ſuitable terms of peace; but that confidence, that harmony, thoſe reliances, are now no more.

Amherſt is, to all appearance, in almoſt a ſtate of inactivity. The Spaniſh ſettlements are all untouched except the Havannah: no attempt has been made on the French at San Domingo. The coaſt of Spain in uninſulted, and our fleet, which was under the brave Admiral Hawke, and which ſtruck terror throughout the proud Don's European dominions, *came* home. In the Eaſt there is more to fear than to hope: a ſickly and diſtreſſed ſquadron, diſappointed and chagrined, what will they, or what can they undertake? The family compact is yet in its full force; no attempt has been made to break it, though it is the bond that is to cement for ever the powers of France and Spain, and make them our eternal enemies. This is a faithful picture of the preſent ſituation of our affairs abroad: thoſe at home every one can ſee.—Will any body then ſay, that he wiſhes for a peace at this time, when notwithſtanding things have gone a little untowardly, they are beginning to put on their former footing, and the arms of our country again to riſe victorious? and it is hoped will continue proſperous, till the enemies are reduced to *ſue* for a peace; and we, with a feeling of humanity, and a true ſpirit becoming conquerors, *grant* it on ſuch terms (by having it in our power to preſcribe them) as ſhall reimburſe our expences, and fix our ſecurity for EVER on a firm baſis. This was Mr. Pitt's aim; and a peace thus ſought for and obtained, is the only one

that the people will unanimouſlly acquiece in. Thus there *is* a way of making the people unanimous; which is by purſuing the war with vigour; by taking ſuch meaſures as ſhall humble our enemies, and by well-timing thoſe meaſures.

Peace, it is true, might be agreeable now, if it *could* be obtained on terms of advantage and ſecurity: but at preſent there does not ſeem any real grounds for expecting it; neither have the people an *extraordinary* good opinion of the peace-makers. On theſe accounts it is, that the thoughts of peace are horrible, are never reflected upon or mentioned but with marks of deteſtation. The unparallelled and unexpected ſucceſs at the Havannah, has elevated, or rather rouzed the ſpirits of the people. They unanimouſly wiſh, that our victorious arms may proceed to the farther annihilating the American power of Spain, and the compleating and ſecuring our empire in the new world.

This empire will be compleat and entirely ſecured if we acquire Spaniſh Florida and French Louiſiana: and there is little more neceſſary for the getting thoſe two provinces into our poſeſſion, than the taking of New Orleans, and what other French ſettlements may be near the mouth of the Miſſiſippi, and of St. Auguſtine on the the promontory of Florida. The poſſeſſion of the ſhores of thoſe two provinces muſt ſoon make us maſters

maſters of the interior countries, which are but thinly inhabited: and, if once in our poſſeſſion, I do no think it can be poſſible for the French and Spaniards together ever to retake them from us; ſo, by our perſiſting in retaining them at all events for ever, we ſhall compleat our empire in North America, and fix its ſecurity on a firm baſis.

Theſe conqueſts being made and poſſeſſed, there will remain a large and ſecure barrier of Indian nations between the compleat body of Britiſh ſettlements in North America, and the great Spaniſh empire of Mexico: and ſuch a diſtribution of territory, with the total excluſion of the French, will be the only means likely to procure a laſting peace on that continent, as well as for ſecuring the proſperity and power of this kingdom, and for enabling it to diſcharge its public debt, and thereby ſecure its great commerce throughout the world.

Whatever views beſides may be entertained by our miniſtry, I cannot help thinking this ought to be their primary object; as what of all purſuits will the moſt important to obtain; becauſe it will fix our colony-ſecurity beyond the reach of rival ſtates in future times to endanger; and add ſuch a ſtrength in numbers of people, in trade, and in navigation, as will eſtabliſh our power uncontroulable on the ocean. The great game of policy I muſt therefore think is now fairly in our hands,

and, if played with true wiſdom, it will infallibly become our own. We ſhall riſe up with the whole ſtake, for which we have, with our worſt enemy, ſo long contended for.

By this ſecondary conqueſt, Canada only can become valuable; and, if it is atchieved, the glories of the preſent adminiſtration will exceed thoſe of the paſt: for they will not only add to our poſſeſſions a much larger extent of territory, but alſo give ſecurity to the whole, and ſuch advantages to their country as it never before received.

With ſo compleat a dominion in thoſe regions, the ſhores and ſeas of our colonies (of as much advantage as the lands) will become indiſputably ours. Neither Spaniards or French ſhould be ever ſuffered to intrude on them, or allowed a fiſhing licence under any pretence whatſoever; becauſe they have rejected great offered favours, violated all faith and ſecurity, and attempted all injuſtice.

Till we have effected this great end, we ought *not* to liſten to any terms of accommodation, becauſe our ſecurity depends upon it; and further let it be obſerved, that there never was a *fairer opportunity* for eſtabliſhing our ſecurity.

Notwithſtanding theſe are the general ſentiments of the people againſt peace, yet as great pains have been taken to inſtil into them a pacific diſpoſition, it cannot be improper to make ſome reflections on the ſubject of peace; a

ſubject

ſubject of ſuch univerſal concern, that every man is more or leſs intereſted in it, and therefore it is worthy of the niceſt and ſtricteſt conſideration.

Towards the making of peace we have but two points to purſue, which are thoſe of our *ſecurity* and our *intereſt*; and theſe *muſt* be effected, or the peace inevitably will be a *bad* one. Now that the people would be univerſally ſatisfied, if theſe two points were gained, is evident, becauſe they deſire to purſue the war for no other ends; and they wiſh for nothing ſo much as a ſafe, honourable and laſting peace. Their great, and indeed only objection is, that *this* is not the time; that notwithſtanding the war has been long and expenſive, the time is not *yet* come for concluding a ſafe, honourable and laſting peace. Our naval war, they ſay, ought to be purſued with that ſpirit, which ſo honourably and ever gloriouſly diſtinguiſhed the years 1758 and 1759, under the direction of men of equal abilities and integrity as guided in thoſe years, until we have ſo far ruined the marine of our enemies, and ſtripped them of ſo many of their ſettlements abroad, as ſhall render the deſigns and end of their family compact at home of no annoyance to us; for can we hope for a laſting peace with France and Spain, who are mutually bound to be eternally our enemies, unleſs we annihilate their marine and American powers, and thereby

put

put ſo much riches, ſecurity and opulence into our own hands, as ſhall ſet us above their ambition? and unleſs we do this, our peace will be neither honourable nor laſting *.

Againſt theſe arguments the advocates for a peace ſay, there is a *neceſſity* for cloſing with ſuch terms as we may be able to get from the enemy; they add, that we *muſt* give way to the untoward ſituation of affairs, and patch up matters as well as we can; for that by continuing the war we ſhall only fool away more money, encreaſe our loſſes, and fight ourſelves into worſe terms every future campaign.

Admitting that there is a ſcarcity of money, (which, however, is not the caſe, as is evident from the ſtocks riſing upon every ſudden report about peace) yet there are ways for raiſing the ſupplies for one or two years longer, ſuppoſing there is not a want of confidence. I remember to have read ſomewhere the remarks of a very ſenſible author on this ſubject.†

He ſays there are four ways of raiſing the ſupplies neceſſary for the carrying on a war, *viz.* 1ſt. By forming a treaſury in time of

* "Beaten as the French are out of all hopes, as well "as out of the field, ſhall we give them back all their "iſlands and all their commerce, that they may be en- "abled once more to diſpute the ſovereignity of the ſeas? "Is it beſt to raiſe an implacable enemy from the duſt, "and give him time to breathe, till he can renew the aſ- "ſault, when he finds it moſt for his advantage; or to take "proper meaſures to impair his ſtrength, ſince we *cannot* "eradicate his malice?"

† Vide Lond. Chron. ſome time ago.

of peace, according to the ridiculous cuſtom of ſome of the antients. 2dly, By raiſing the whole expence of the year by taxes in the current year. 3dly, By loans on annuities, or taxes, which ſhall diſcharge both intereſt and principal in a given number of years. 4thly, By a tax for perpetuity, that ſhall pay only the bare intereſt of the ſum raiſed. The firſt and laſt we reject as pernicious: the other two remain to be canvaſſed.

In order to judge which of the two is moſt eligible, let us ſuppoſe a trader was to gain annually, by his capital, 300*l.* and to expend only 200*l.* by which he would increaſe his fortune annually 100*l.* if no bad debts happened, But, let us ſuppoſe, by the failure of a correſpondent, that in one year he ſhould loſe 1000*l.* of his ſtock, which would leſſen his annual profits 100*l.* and conſequently reduce his gains to only 200*l.* *per annum.* Now is it to be ſuppoſed that he could, conſiſtent either with his dignity or inclinations, all at once reduce his family from 200*l.* *per annum* to 100*l.* only? Where is the man who would do ſo? Is it not more reaſonable to imagine, that he would diminiſh his expences only 25 *per cent.* and by ſaving the other 25 *per cent.* inſtead of his uſual 50 *per cent.* repair his wounded fortune?

But if, in ſuch a caſe, every one was to aim to mend his injured fortune, by diminiſhing half his expence, and this conduct was become general, what employment would the poor

have?

have? How are they to be ſupported? What rents would the proprietors of lands receive on ſuch a diminution of conſumption? Beſides, to aſſert that a private man, who is prudent, ought, in ſuch a caſe, to diminiſh his diſburſements in proportion to the diminution of his capital, *&c.* proves too much. For if ſuch a reduction of a man's expence would not give him a ſenſation of diſtreſs, by ſinking his appearance below his uſual quality, why any clamour about national debts, ſince the intereſt of 200 millions, at 4 *per cent.* is but eight millions *per annum*, and does not amount to 2*s.* in the pound on our whole conſumption? perhaps not to 1*s.* 6*d.* in the pound? We the rather aſk this queſtion, becauſe in national taxes, if equally borne, every man's fortune or expence is diminiſhed by the tax in equal proportion, and therefore no man's quality or poſt is ſunk relatively by ſuch tax. If one man's eſtate brings him in clear 1000*l. per annum*, and another brings him in only 100*l.* clear, after a tax is laid and deducted of 20*l. per cent.* the relative abilities of each are the ſame: 200*l.* in taxes on a 1000*l.* is the ſame relatively as 20*l.* on 100*l. per annum.* Hence, any man may diſcern, with half an eye, which is the beſt method of raiſing money for the public ſervice.

To illuſtrate this diſpute of ſtate loans ſtill further. Let us ſuppoſe, in the common run of things, that we ſhall always have a twenty years

years peace, and a ten years war, in every thirty years: let us ſuppoſe, at the ſame time, ten millions extraordinary is the ſum neceſſary every year to carry on this war. How this is to be raiſed is the queſtion. Will it be beſt to raiſe the ten millions every year during the war, and pay nothing in time of peace, or to raiſe it by loans, and rather pay an equal ſhare of the expence in the years of peace, as well as in the years of war? If a common carrier has ten hundred weight to remove, would he put it on his horſe's back all at once, or remove it at three ſeveral times? The laſt method, it is ſelf-evident, he might purſue with eaſe to his horſe, and advantage to himſelf: but would not the other break his horſe's back, and injure himſelf? The application is obvious. A tax of three millions *per annum* extraordinary would be but a light burden, and yet it would ſupport ſuch a war for ever; although, perhaps, it is not one thirty-third part of our annual conſumption.

But it is alledged, " we ſhall not only ruin our trade by loans, but load poſterity, and leave immenſe debts on our poor children." True; we leave them a large debt to pay, but we leave them *quid pro quo*; we leave them a valuable conſideration, *viz.* liberty! glory! a high rank and poſt among the ſtates of Europe! an extended commerce! North-America freed from all incumbrances! a ſafe navigation! the royalty! well cultivated and improved lands!

increaſed manufactures! full employment for the poor! raiſed rents! a vaſt exportation for grain! And yet, with all theſe advantages, we ſhall leave to our heirs proviſions and manufactures thirty *per cent.* cheaper, on an average, than they were before we had any taxes or exciſes on the neceſſaries or ſuperfluities of life! Theſe are the boons! the valuable conſiderations, we ſhall leave poſterity for the intereſt of the national debt they are to pay, and part of the principal*.

Beſides theſe advantages above ſpecified are not all: a foreign war, carried on by national loans and taxes, enforces labour, enlarges the ſcene of induſtry, increaſes employment, augments commerce, enlarges conſumption, encourages tillage, and vivifies the whole ſtate. Even that arrant Jacobite, Dr. Davenant, in his Diſcourſes on the Revenues, could not help acknowledging many of thoſe advantages aroſe from King William's wars: though the confeſſion ſeemed to go againſt his ſeditious and malignant ſtomach. When he was a commiſſioner of exciſe, taxes were a bleſſing to the nation; when he was turned out, his cry was, "they would ruin our manufactures;" though their only effect in this caſe has been to keep down the price of labour, by neceſſitating the *Slothful and Luxurious* to labour more, and produce more

* *Ibid.*

more commodities at a cheaper rate for the foreign market.

Notwithſtanding the moſt hopeful proſpects of ſucceſs in continuing the war; notwithſtanding the many methods which may be thought of for raiſing the ſupplies, without incurring the odium of the people; yet I am not againſt making a peace, if we can obtain ſuch terms, as by our conqueſts we have a right and ought to demand.

To give peace to a diſtreſſed enemy ‡ is as noble, as to reduce him to a ſtate of humiliation.

But how is peace to be given to ſuch an enemy as France? a nation that never accepted of peace, while it was in their power to protract war: and never could be reſtrained from hoſtilities by the ſacred ties of peace, when it ſuited their convenience or ambitious views to break the moſt ſolemn treaties.

Therefore, let it be remembered, that it is not in their power to continue the war; and that to grant them peace upon any other conditions, than ſuch as ſhall deprive them of the means to be vexatious and hurtful, and diſable them to renew the conteſt and calamities of the preſent war, will be delivering our enemies out of their misfortunes, and entailing miſery upon ourſelves.

‡ Monitor Numb. 233.

His Majeſty appears in the attitude of the greateſt Prince in Europe; and his kingdoms never ſhown ſo bright, in hiſtory, as they now will deſcend to the lateſt memory, for martial ſkill and proweſs. Whatever, therefore, may be our conceſſions towards reſtoring tranquility to the belligerant powers, great care out to be taken, that thoſe conditions be not ſo precipitate and generous, as to eclipſe the glory, which ſurrounds his throne, and to prevent his ſubjects from reaping the happy effects of a war, that can command an honourable and laſting peace.

How laudable ſoever, therefore, it may be, to pity the calamities of our enemies; it is moſt to be wiſhed, that neither pity, nor any other motive may incline his Majeſty to hearken to advice, which ſhall reſtore France and Spain to any power they have loſt, either in riches, territory, or number of ſailors: but that he will look upon every man to be an enemy to his family, both as to its intereſt and honour, and to the poſterity of Great Britain, who becomes an advocate for giving up any conqueſt, which can reſtore the ſtrength of our enemies in any manner.

The deſolation brought by their barbarous arms, upon our allies in Germany, unprovoked and undeſerved, where they prevailed, ſhould convince every body, what they would do to Great Britain, ſhould it ever be left in their power to recover their naval ſtrength, and

to enjoy the means of reſuming and compleating their favorite ſcheme of invading this iſland.

Where would be glory, if after riſqueing the event of a long and bloody war, after ſacrificing twenty millions and upwards of money, and the loſs of many thouſand ſubjects, in defence of our juſt rights and poſſeſſions, and when our ſucceſs, in every quarter of the world, has put it out of the power of that perfidious nation to hurt us hereafter; ſhould we wantonly give up again, what would enable France to put us to the like expence, and, perhaps to attack us with a more advantage?

The law of ſelf-defence and ſelf-preſervation, gave us juſt cauſe to begin this war: and by the law of nature and nations, all people have a right to purſue ſuch meaſures, as ſhall be found neceſſary for their preſervation and defence. What we have conqured has been obtained in a juſt war: and we are intitled to ſuch acquiſitions by the laws of nature and of nations, as well as ſelf-defence.—They that inſinuate the contrary, that Britain has no right by that law to add her conqueſts to the Britiſh dominions, eirther diſcover much ignorance, or partiality to our enemies: they either don't underſtand the ſubject, or their hearts are ſo corrupted, that rather than not ruin their country, they chuſe to urge againſt

conviction and the plain principles of law, juſtice and common ſenſe.

French perfidy, is ſo well known, that there is an abſolute neceſſity, that only the moſt wiſe and upright men conduct the arduous taſk of *peace-making*.

If we expect to reap any good from our pacific negociations, let them be committed to men, who have given proofs that they are capable of conducting, with ability and dexterity, that important buſineſs with the moſt ſubtile and tenacious enemy.

None ought to be preferred to the great truſt, on which the advantages gained by our arms are to be *realized*; on which the honour and glory of our ſovereign, and the welfare and ſecurity of his ſubjects and dominions depend; but they, who, (beſides a perfect knowledge of the intereſts, pretenſions and connections of the ſeveral European ſtates; a well-grounded ſkill in the principles of public law, with a capacity to apply them on every particular occaſion; a thorough acquaintance with the commerce, the colonies, and the manufacturers of their own country; and a clear apprehenſion of the rights, pre-eminences and juſt claims of their own ſovereign; and being well inſtructed in all the inſtances of infraction of former treaties, which provoked Britain to take up arms) are men of ſuch rank and conſequence amongſt ourſelves, as may command reſpect and procure them

authority

authority amongſt our enemies; and who with every other qualification ſhall be endowed with a ſagacity to diſcover the fineſſe and artifices of the other public miniſters; with fidelity, probity and diſinteredneſs, to execute punctually all the articles of their inſtructions, ſo as not to be biaſſed by any view whatever; with a noble and becoming courage and reſolution to inſiſt upon their propoſals without haughtineſs, and to oppoſe all encroachments; and with a great preſence of mind to anſwer *a-propos* all obligations, and to ſolve all difficulties.

But ſhould the advantages of the war be given up, as they were at Utrecht, by the daſh of a pen; the reputation of the miniſtry will fall in the ruins of their country; which unanimouſly declares againſt re-inſtating France and Spain in their American ſettlements.

Therefore, if we treat with the French, let theſe preliminaries be laid down: before we enter upon a new treaty or liſten to any plauſible propoſals, let our plenipotentiaries inſiſt upon a punctual performance of the conditions ſolemnly promiſed by former treaties; ſuch as the demolition of Dunkirk: and if they refuſe doing Britain this immediate juſtice, previous to a peace; or to give hoſtages for its performance, how can we depend upon the ſincerity of any new engagements now to be entered into, when the reſtoration of that port and fortification remains a monument of their infidelity

infidelity and perjury? An enemy that comes to treat with ſuch a temper gives us great reaſon to ſuſpect he has no intention to keep his word for the future; or that he is inclined to execute his preſent engagements any better than heretofore.

However foreign ſome may think this previous demand may be towards putting an end to a war begun in America, and whoſe primary object was confined to that quarter of the world; yet I muſt inſiſt upon it as equally neceſſary for the *honour* and the *intereſt* of this nation to make no peace without obtaining ſatisfaction on this head. †

By this the *honour* of the Britiſh nation will be vindicated, when France and all Europe ſhall ſee that Great Britain retains a ſpirit to reſent injuries; and knows the proper time to exert her power to prevent them for the future: and without this it will be impoſſible to take care of the true *intereſt* of the nation. For, as I hope, there is no proſpect that France can ever cope with us by her naval power, it is moſt probable that in any future war with England, the French will have no way left to annoy our navigation, but by watching or merchant-ſhips with ſwarms of privateers; and they have no harbour near our iſland, ſo well ſituated for a *piratical war*, and to injure our commerce, as Dunkirk.

All

† Ibid.

All our American conqueſt are of ſuch value, as not one of them ought to be given up purely to bring an enemy into a good humour. By keeping them all in our poſſeſſion, we reduce the ſtrength and riches of France more and more: and conſequently make them leſs able to feed their ambition with continual quarrels. But this is not the only reaſon.—What ſatiſfaction can France offer us for the expence of this war, into which ſhe forced us by her perfidy and attempts to drive us out of America? ſurely, till ſuch ſatisfaction be made, it would be doing great injuſtice to Britain, ſhould any of theſe conqueſts be given up. It was mere vanity and licentiouſneſs in our arms and treaſure, to be at the expence and loſs of men and money in theſe conqueſts, if it was never intended to make any uſe of them for public advantage.

I do not wonder that after the ſword has been drawn near ſeven years, the nation at length ſhould be deſirous of peace: but I wonder, that in the *pretended* preliminaries, ſtill handed about, not a word is ſaid about diſſolving the family compact; for a diſſolution of the union between France and Spain, if we have any regard for ourſelves, ought not only to be one of the firſt preliminaries, as being one of the moſt neceſſary articles, but the baſis of the future peace: " A treaty, " that does not include a formal renunciation of " that union, on their part, would be equal

" to a formal guarantee of it on our part: in " its inevitable tendency it would amount to " total prohibition of any lucrative commerce " with Spain in time of peace; and on any " future rupture with either power, it would " bring both upon us, when they will be freſh " and vigorous, inſtead of being worn out as " they now are, and fainting under the weight " of our victorious arms."

Neither in theſe *pretended* preliminaries is there any mention made of our German friends. What have the famous Conſiderations on the German War, or the Review of the Reign of George II. put all thoughts of them out of our heads? or have they done any thing more than declaim againſt them? Have either, or both thoſe writers, offered one ſolid argument or reaſon, which is not evidently drawn from faction? and yet they are univerſally reckoned the beſt on the ſubject.—But amongſt the numerous declaimers againſt Germany, is there to be found a remedy for the evil? Do they any of them tell us of a method how to remove the cauſe of our engagements with Germany? Declamation is idle, except it contains ſomething that will make an impreſſion on the mind; and in this caſe it is abſurd, becauſe it does not preſcribe the means for removing the object, which the declamation is aimed againſt. Even they who cry out for peace do not ſay, that our connexions with Germany will be effectually removed by it. In what light then ought we

conſider

conſider this outcry againſt Germany? Has it not all the appearance of being a *ſham* one, calculated only to ſerve a preſent purpoſe, in reconciling the nation to unworthy conditions of peace; and in furniſhing thoſe with a pretence to popularity, who could otherwiſe have no pretence to any, and ſo keep power in thoſe hands, which could elſe never keep it?

I remember, that about the time of the late diſturbances in Ireland, ſomething like the following appeared in one of our public papers. " During the firſt three years after the revolution the Iriſh nation was in rebellion, and the Engliſh voted large ſums for ſubduing them. In the preſent war we have been ſpending greater ſums to prevent the French from penetrating into Hanover. Is the expence of reducing a rebellion in Ireland, or of defending an electorate, the greater evil? Ireland, ſince the time of that rebellion, has remained at peace for ſeventy years. The electorate, upon our preſent plan of defending it, muſt every year, even after a peace, be held out as a premium to tempt our enemies to invade it, in order to enrich themſelves at our coſt with the price of its ranſom. Which of theſe evils, upon our preſent plan, is like to be moſt laſting?"

This ſhrewd little hint is expreſſive of much meaning, and brings the point of my argument home to ourſelves. It matters not what

the declaimers againſt Germany ſay, if they do not propoſe a method for removing the cauſe; a cauſe that will ever ſubſiſt, while the Elector of Hanover and the King of England are the ſame perſon.

Is it not ſomething ſurprizing, that the allied army ſhould be ſuffered to proceed in its operations without receiving any reinforcements? Could our pilots perceive the evil in ſending more troops, and not the neceſſity of calling home thoſe that are there? for the ſame motives, which could teach them to diſcern the firſt, might have pointed out to them the latter, ſince both ought to ariſe from the ſame cauſe? This is a queſtion which the tools of ——— would do well to ſolve; and if the Auditor (for the Briton I have no hopes of) can wreſt a vindication out of ſo evident a paradox, I ſhould be glad to ſee it in his next number, being thoroughly convinced he cannot do his employers a better piece of ſervice, unleſs he can perſuade the people to put *confidence* in them.

As an antidote to the clamour of a ſet of tools, I will ſhew that the German war was not only unavoidable; but that there is an abſolute neceſſity, for the ſake of our own honour, for including Germany in the terms of the approaching peace; becauſe, as I ſhall prove, there is not only the faith of treaties depending, but we have actually, during the courſe of this

war,

war, received advantages from our connexions with Germany.

When we excluded from the throne the family of the Stuarts, we caſt our eyes round Europe for a Sovereign; but we could find no Prince of the Proteſtant religion, who had no foreign dominion: what then muſt we have done?—have ſubmitted to abſolute government, been torn by pieces by a civil war, or choſen a King who had political intereſts? It was thought beſt to chuſe the latter, however diſtinct thoſe intereſts might be from the good of this nation. If this misfortune was inevitable in its cauſe, it was impoſſible to prevent its being the ſame in its effect. The evil then of keeping conſiderable armies in Germany is (in ſome meaſure) engrafted in the eſtabliſhment. Without doubt all Engliſhmen wiſh the crown had no territory out of this iſland, that our ſtrength might be kept within it, but ſecondary cauſes have diſpoſed things otherwiſe, and how ſhall we alter them? It might be propoſed the giving Hanover to one of the royal family; as it would (as far as human wiſdom can be allowed to divine) be greatly for the intereſt of both Great-Britain and Hanover, by taking away a pretence from France for invading it when at war with us. This meaſure is practicable; for by the feudal law, by which the fiefs in Germany are regulated, a vaſſal *can* give his land to whom he will; that is, the *dominium utile*, or the profits; the ſuperior's

perior's conſent is only neceſſary to eſtabliſh what is called the *dominium directum:* there are many examples in Germany which ſhew, that ſuch alienations are agreeable to the Germanic conſtitution and practice. But as long as the ſame perſon is King of Great-Britain and Elector of Hanover, the evil will not be removed.

The preſent importance of Hanover will appear to thoſe who conſider, that, according to the general ſyſtem, it cannot fall under the juriſdiction of any foreign potentate, eſpecially of thoſe engaged in the German war, without a revolution in the political world, the conſequence of which would (in ſpite of all that the moſt able caſuiſt can ſay) would affect Great-Britain; for if the electorate were left to itſelf, it would become the prey of France, or would fall to the houſe of Auſtria, or would be conquered by the King of Pruſſia; in any of which three caſes it would be too much advantage to whoſoever ſhould add it to their own dominion. Hanover, notwithſtanding it has been plundered and made the ſeat of war, is not, as it was, a mean principality; it has great influence upon affairs. Ever ſince its Electors became Kings of England, the riches, which they have made to paſs into it, havegiven it many degrees of power, which it had not in former times. The ſtand, which it makes againſt France in the preſent war, is a convincing proof of this. Its armies have now learned

learned to fight, and its men are become veteran ſoldiers. If this electorate were now in the ſame ſtate of imbecility, in which it was when its Sovereigns were called to the crown of England, its falling under the dominion of any potentate would, perhaps, be in itſelf a matter of indifference.

Now with reſpect to the faith of treaties, ſo far as they relate to the preſent war, every one knows, that when we had entered into a war with France, in a cauſe that was purely national, France thought not of diſturbing Germany, till ſhe ſaw herſelf baffled in her hopes of ſucceeding in her ſingle contention with us. She then turned her eyes towards the empire, and there ſaw an opening for new projects. The courts of Vienna and Berlin were then in a jarring ſtate; the former having formed a grand alliance for diſpoſſeſſing the latter of Sileſia, which under our guaranty had been ceded to it by treaty. France ſtood ready, under pretence of joining either party in that quarrel, to make repriſals on the electorate of Hanover for his loſſes to the King of Great Britain. The court of London was aware of this, and thereupon applied to that of Vienna for ſupporting, in a common cauſe, the unoffending electorate, at the time that it entered into a ſubſidy treaty with Ruſſia for effecting the ſame purpoſe. But the Empreſs Queen, bent only on proſecuting her own cauſe, refuſed to engage in ſo juſt a common one; which reaſonably

ſonably diſguſted England; while Pruſſia, fearful of our Ruſſian alliance, and doubtful of the effectual aſſiſtance of France, farther than in ſeizing the electorate of Hanover, propoſed an alliance with Great Britain; not with a deſign to draw her troops into the Empire, but with a view to keep all foreign troops out of it, and thereby to confine the ſtruggles in Germany to the German powers only. But Ruſſia, as well as France, having a particular point to carry, theſe two powers joined Auſtria and Saxony, and drew Sweden into the alliance, being all bent on public miſchief, for the promotion of their ſeveral private ends. Thus the misfortunes which have happened, were in fact found unavoidable. The The King of Pruſſia's object is to preſerve Sileſia, and our to ſecure Hanover: It may be a pity we have it to ſecure; but the electorate ought not to be made to pay for our national diſputes, and national faith and credit ſhould ſecure the fair fulfilling of our engagements. However extenſive theſe engagements are, and however expenſive they have been to us, yet in no war they have been ſo conducive to our advantage, as in the preſent; for, notwithſtanding all that can be urged to the contrary, it is certain that the German war has exhauſted France, and thereby the better enabled us to proſecute our own in ſo very ſucceſsful a manner; and as we have entered into ſolemn engagements with our allies, not only our preſent honour,

honour, but alſo our future caedit, will depend on our faithfully fulfilling them. Beſides, as we have undoubtedly reaped advantages from the diſtreſſes of ſome of our allies, and the noble ſtruggles made by others, we ought to perſevere in our endeavours to reſtore them to ſafety, and by all means preſerve the good faith which we have voluntarily plighted.

If we are gone too far with our German connexions to recede, as was lately the opinion, ſurely we are gone too far to leave them out at the peace: Heſſe, and other countries, have been ruined by fighting in our cauſe, and they expect from our hands, or through our means, ſome indemnifications, becauſe they cannot of themſelves oblige their cruel enemies to grant any; but we may, who have been conquerors in other parts of the world; and we ought, by every tie of gratitude, of honour, and of juſtice, to intercede in their behalf: this is the way that we ſhould indemnify them; a way that is both reaſonable and equitable.

That our alliances have coſt us ſome millions of pounds, and ſome thouſands of lives, is not to be denied. Theſe are the ſad accounts we muſt read in the hiſtory of war; but does not the ſame page inform us, that while poverty, oppreſſion, ruin, and deſolation were raging in other countries, we enjoyed the ſweets of peace; our commerce extended itſelf every year, beyond the ſtrength of imagination to have fancied; our revenues conſequently in-

creaſed; and to compleat all, our people were content. Had France in the beginning of the war, declined all continental connections; had ſhe dedicated but half the millions, and half the men, ſhe has waſted in Germany, to her marine; had ſhe turned all that ſtrength to the ſupport of her colonies, and to the invaſion of Great Britain; the ſcene had been altered, and the poſture of affairs had worn another face.

I know it will be ſaid, that we ſtill muſt have triumphed at ſea, had France done her utmoſt to contend for an equality. Admit it: yet, when we reflect on the exceſſive diſtance of our ſettlements from Britain, and from one another, what embaraſſments muſt enſue from the impoſſibility of diſcovering the deſtination of the enemies ſeveral ſquadrons? we remember how near M. de la Clue was eſcaping from admiral Boſcawen; and, notwithſtanding the fortune of that day, in preventing his junction with M. Conflans, how difficult we found it to give Hawke a ſuperiority over Conflans alone. Such are the calls for our men of war, either for our convoys, our colonies, or our expeditions, that notwithſtanding the prodigious number of ſhips in commiſſion, we cannot poſſibly be provided with ſufficient fleets, to preſerve a ſuperiority in every ſervice.

I ſhall be anſwered, that granting all this to be true, yet as we ſhall ſtill upon the whole be ſtronger at ſea than our adverſary, ſhe will never

never be able to hurt us eſſentially ; and therefore all the millions devoted to continental meaſures have been ſo much of the riches of the nation idly diſſipated and loſt. But however ſelf-evident this propoſition may apppear, I am humbly of opinion, that had not thoſe millions been appropriated to the ſervice of Germany, the other millions that we have expended ſo glorioufly in America on the grand object of the war, would have been ſquandered, and the conqueſt of Canada defeated ; for I am informed, by unqueſtionable authority, by ſome of the principle inſtruments employed in that honourable enterprize, that had the Canadians received but a very little aſſiſtance more from France than they did, the undertaking had been rendered impracticable. Can we then ſuppoſe, that if France, in the beginning of the war, had turned her thoughts from Germany, to the defence of her colonies, ſhe could not have ſent a little more aſſiſtance, nay, very conſiderable armaments both of ſhips and men? This I take to be a full anſwer, to what has been ſaid concerning the German war, as a diverſion.

After reaping advantages from a cauſe then, we out not to think of deſerting it ; becauſe ſuch a practice muſt infallibly be deemed by the whole world, as ſcandalouſly ſelfiſh as it would be ſhamefully perfidious. Let us, at at all events, endeavour to bring our cauſe to a good iſſue ; and then propoſe means, or at

leaſt apply them, for preventing future inconveniences. But as our compacts are made, and I am inclined to think rightly and reaſonably, there is certainly nothing that ſhould influence our breaking them but abſolute neceſſity. This is a plea we cannot yet urge with a good colour of reaſon; and national faith, when once ſolemnly plighted, is of too important a nature to be ſported with, or wantonly violated. The deſerting our allies, at the concluſion of Queen Ann's war, fixed an almoſt indeliable ſtain on our public honour. The ſacrificing of the poor Catalans was then generally deemed, and has ever ſince been thought an act of the higheſt cruelty. Our defection from the Dutch has been as conſtantly thought, and often urged by them, a ſufficient plea for their not daring to rely on our fidelity; which, though in fact is but merely ſpecious, has had its weight to our great prejudice. Nay, our very national councils have been frequently our ſelf-reproachers in this matter. It highly behoves us then to be more circumſpect in all circumſtances of a like nature, leſt we ſo proſtitute our faith, as to have it become proverbally infamous. An honeſt nation, like a man of honour, ſhould ſtand to a bargain, though over-reached in the making of it.

I think I have made it ſufficiently clear, that we out not to make peace, without including our German friends in the conditions of it. What will be the caſe, God knows; but I tremble

tremble for the national honour, for its intereſt, and, above all, for our poſterity; who I am afraid will find themſelves loaded with a great debt, ſurrounded by implacable enemies, who will then have rendered themſelves formidable. Strange! that we are are all at once ſo infatuated with a love of peace, that theſe ſentiments of dread are become general, even throughout the whole nation. That there muſt be a cauſe, will hardly be denied; that the cauſe may be removed, is univerſally deſired. In a ſtate of ſuſpence, without knowing any thing certain, and tortured with hints, inſinuations, and inuendoes, ſaid to come from people in no common rank of life, viz. that we may go on fighting till we fall in the field; that France is ſtill powerful, and we ought to dread irritating too much ſuch a powerful nation; that our conqueſts are too numerous for us to keep; that they are our ruin, &c. I ſay, tortured with theſe inſinuations, which are abominable and odious to all true lovers of their country, and directly oppoſite to the united voice of the whole people, they are almoſt tempted to believe *we have been ſueing for a peace with France.*—Will France grant us any thing but ignominious terms?

Shall we ingloriouſly ſurrender the advantages we have obtained at the price of ſo much blood and treaſure? if we do this, can it be long ere we ſubmit to the yoke itſelf? No, I hope ſtill to ſee the pride of France ſubdued

by

by the ſpirit of Britain.—For that and therefore, let us with Cato.

' Hold it out, and fight it to the laſt,
' A year, a day, an hour, of virtuous liberty,
' Is worth a whole eternity in bondage.

POST-

POSCRIPT.

I do not doubt but every Engliſhman received with rapture the joyful news of the taking of the Havannah; but this joy (ſo ſeldom in theſe days) "ſuggeſted painful apprehenſions." The place is of ſuch great importance, that every man, who has the love of his country at heart, wiſhes we were to keep it; and his wiſhes ariſe from this patriotic motive, that unleſs we annihilate the enemies power we ſhall never be ſafe; therefore if we reſtore what we take, our going to war ſignifies nothing; ſince the enemy at a peace will be as powerful as he was before he went to war, and in a ſhort time, from his implacable hatred, and the deſigns of the family compact, will again inſult our trade, our ſettlements, &c. and embroil us in another bloody diſpute. The only way, therefore which can gain a laſting peace, is to preſerve the poſſeſſions we acquire; or, if, as ſome of the tools—— ſay, we *cannot* preſerve them, becauſe we have not people enough to ſend to them, let us do as the *late* worthy miniſtry did at Louiſbourg, blow up the fortifications of all ſuch places, ſo that if they *muſt* be reſtored to the enemy, they

they may be in a condition that will be of little or no ſervice to them, and perhaps coſt them twenty years labour before they are again made dangerous to us. But the thoughts of reſtoreing the Havannah we can never brook with. Shall ſo many brave men loſe their lives, and the daſh of a pen throw away the bleſſed fruits of all their labours?——It's importance, together with the whole iſland of Cuba, will beſt appear from accurate account of both; after reading which it will be obvious to the weakeſt underſtanding, whether it would be ſafe or prudent in us to reſtore ſo valuable a conqueſt, which may be made of ſo much advantage to us, and muſt ſo weaken the principal ſtrength of the enemy, as will in all probability prevent another war for a long ſeries of years.

The port of the Havannah is, the beſt in the Weſt-Indies, and one of the fineſt in the world. It is ſo large, that a thouſand ſail of ſhips may ride commodiouſly and ſafely, without either anchor or cable, no wind being able to hurt them. It is alſo ſo deep, that the largeſt veſſels anchor at a ſmall diſtance from the ſhore, and there is commonly ſix fathoms water. The entrance, which has no bar or ſhoals to obſtruct it, is by a channel about three quarters of a mile in length, but ſo narrow, that only one ſhip can go in at a time. The harbour, into which it leads at the north-weſt corner, is a long ſquare, lying north and ſouth. At the other three corners, it forms three creeks

or

or bays. At the bottom of that in the ſouth-eaſt corner, lies the town of Guan Abacoa, two leagues from the Havannah by land, but little more than a league by ſea.

Our poſſeſſions in the Weſt-Indies, as well as our trade thither, are ſo greatly intereſted in the poſſeſſion of this port, that the conqueſt of it is of the higheſt advantage to our commercial intereſt, and particularly for the preſervation of Jamaica, whcih being ſituate between Cuba, Hiſpaniola, and the continent, it is liable to be invaded from thoſe three quarters at once; and its ſecurity is the more precarious, as the French are alſo poſſeſſed of the weſt part of Hiſpaniola. On the other hand it is very plain, that, if we keep poſſeſſion of the Havannah, our ſhips, both there and at Jamaica, will be always ready to pick up the ſtraggling ſhips of the Spaniards, which they will not be very able to keep in a body without the help of this port, it being as impoſſible for their great unwieldy ſhips to turn up to windward from the bay of Mexico or Porto Bello without ſeparation, as it would be to paſs the gulph of Florida.

The Spaniards have been ſo ſenſible of the importance of this place, ſo ſenſible of their weakneſs, and jealous of their riches in theſe parts, that it has been very difficult for any ingenious man, when once taken by them, to get his liberty, fearing he might give ſuch intelligence as would be the cauſe of their ruin;

witneſs their blind-folding of all ſtrangers, when they paſſed their cities and caſtles: for they dreaded an old prophecy, *That the Engliſh would as freely walk the ſtreets of the Havannah, as ever the Spaniards did.*

The commerce carried on in this port, which is very conſiderable, we will, for the ſake of perſpicuity, divide into the particular commerce of the iſle of Cuba, and that more general by the galleons. The former conſiſts in hides, uſually ſtiled, of the Havannah, which are excellent and of great value; ſugar, tobacco, admirable in its kind, &c. though ſtrangers are prohibited to trade, yet a contraband commerce is carried on briſker here than at La Vera Cruz. It muſt be obſerved, that the traffic of the iſland of Cuba is not entirely confined to the Havannah, but extends itſelf to other ports, particularly San Jago de Cuba, where there are frequently many little veſſels from the Canaries and other parts, which trade entirely for the commodities of the country. As to the general commerce, this port is the place of rendezvous for all ſhips, particularly from Porto Bello and La Vera Cruz, which return into Spain from the Indies. When the fleet uſed to be in the bay, proviſions were exceſſively dear on ſhore, and money ſo plenty, that a Spaniard expected half a piece of eight a day from a male ſlave, and a quarter from a female, out of what they earned by their labour. The fleet generally ſailed from thence, through the

channel

channel of Bahama, in the month of September, and is the richeſt in the world; ſince in ſilver and merchandize there is ſeldom leſs than thirty millions of pieces of eight on board, or ſix millions ſeven hundred and fifty thouſand pounds of our money.

Cuba is the largeſt and fineſt iſland in America. It is about 780 miles in length, and from 40 to 132 miles in breadth. It lies within the tropic of Cancer, about 40 miles weſt of Hiſpaniola, and 90 to the northward of Jamaica, commanding the gulph of Mexico, Florida, and the windward paſſage, where it may with propriety be called *the ſhield of the Weſt-Indies*, and is by far the moſt temperate and pleaſant of all the Antilles. The Europeans, who are generally troubled with the heat of theſe parts, confeſs themſelves agreeably refreſhed by the cooling winds, which blow in the morning and evening throughout this iſland.

There is no winter here: but in June, July and Auguſt, when the ſun is moſt vertical, they have great rains and often violent ſtorms, which greatly mitigate the extreme heat of the climate. The faireſt ſeaſon is when the ſun is fartheſt from them, and then it is hotteſt in the morning; for towards noon a ſea-breeze ſprings up, which blows pretty briſk till the evening. The trade wind in thoſe ſeas blows from E. and by N. at the full and change of the moon, from October to April, they have

briſk winds at N. and N. W. which in December and January often turn into ſtorms, though this is called their fair ſeaſon.

As to the ſoil, it differs pretty much; the weſtern portion of the country is moſtly plain, and if it were properly cultivated, might be fruitful. The eaſtern part is exceedingly mountainous, and from thence there runs a chain of hills almoſt through the whole iſland; but the farther you go, the leſs rough and barren they are. From theſe hills there run down to the north and ſouth many rivers, which, beſides their beſtowing verdure and coolneſs as they paſs, are full of very large and good fiſh. The greateſt inconveniency in *Cuba* is its being overgrown with woods, which is chiefly owing to the lazineſs of the Spaniards: Amongſt theſe, however, there are ſome very valuable, particularly cedars of an enormous ſize, and other ſorts of odoriferous woods. Birds there are of all kinds, more than in any other of the iſlands; and the Spaniards at their firſt landing having ſuffered ſome black cattle to ſtray into the woods, they by degrees turned wild, and having furniſhed the iſland with that breed, which, together with tobacco, ſugar and copper, make now the principal riches of its inhabitants. Many fine fat beaſts are left to rot on the ground, great numbers being killed purely for the hides, which are ſent to Spain, and in the ſlaughter of them the negroes are employed.

It is ſaid to have in general the beſt land of any iſland in America, and is capable of producing prodigious quantities of all the commodities furniſhed by that quarter of the world; particularly ginger, long pepper, and other ſpices, caſſia fiſtula, maſtic and aloes; large cedars, and other odoriferous trees; oaks, pines, palm-trees, plenty of large vines, fine cotton trees, and excellent tobacco; beſides plenty of pine-apples, plantains, bananas, guavas, and lemons. Here are alſo ſome large walks of cacao trees, and good ſugar works, worked by horſe and water mills, which are ſaid to make the beſt ſugars in the Weſt-Indies, though in no great quantity, for want of hands to cultivate the canes. Here are mines of copper, which furniſh the Spaniſh plantations with metal for all their braſs guns; and gold duſt having been formerly found in the ſands of the rivers; it is conjectured, that there are mines of gold, if not of ſilver too, in the mountains, of which there runs a large ridge from the eaſt to the weſt end of the iſland; but the Spaniards having deſtroyed all the natives, they either never diſcovered where the mines were, or never opened them for fear of an invaſion.

Adjacent to this iſland are great conveniences both for making ſalt and catching fiſh. The iſland abounds with horſes, mules, ſheep, wild boars, hogs, and cattle of a larger breed than in any other part of America; parrots, partridges with blue heads, and large tortoiſes.

Here

Here are quarries of flints, and fountains of bitumen, which is uſed for ſhips inſtead of pitch.

The black cattle, brought hither by the Spaniards, have multiplied to ſuch a prodigious degree, that large herds of them run wild in the woods, for want of people enough to eat their fleſh, though great numbers of them are yearly killed for their hides and tallow.

To enforce the reaſon of the premiſes, I ſhall now take my leave with a few obſervations on the infinite conſequence of *keeping* the Havannah, together with the whole iſland of Cuba, which, though they have been lately uſhered into the world by the channel of the public papers, cannot be amiſs to reprint here.

In the firſt place, it is well known that all ſhips coming to Europe, from any part of Spaniſh America on this ſide the Braſils, or from Louiſiana, muſt neceſſarily paſs by the Havanna, becauſe they cannot poſſibly work it up to windward, as was before remarked; conſequently, if we keep a proper force ſtationed there, neither the flotas, nor the galleons, nor the French trade from the Miſſiſippi, can paſs without our conſent. Now money being the very ſinew of war, it is evident that this meaſure will effectually hamſtring both our preſent antagoniſts, and force them to ſit down content with equitable terms of accommodation; among which I ſhall never reckon the reſtitution of the Havanna to be one; for as it is a fair conqueſt,

queſt, we have an undoubted right to keep it, and ought to keep it, *ſe defendendo*; ſeeing it will probably enable us, while we hold it, to keep the peace of Europe; at leaſt it will prevent any wanton cauſeleſs ruptures with Spain for the future; which we may otherwiſe naturally expect in the proſecution of the family compact. And who does not ſee that theſe reaſons are ſufficient to authorize our keeping poſſeſſion of it, almoſt at any riſque, on the very principles which juſtify our retaining Gibraltar?

The poſſeſſion of the Havanna will give us, while the war laſts, the ſole ſupplying of the *Terra Firma* with European goods, without which the Spaniards, whatever the Indians may do, cannot poſſibly live. By this means we ſhould neceſſitate them to trade with us for immenſe ſums, at a very great profit; nay, almoſt on our own terms: for no goods would be ſent them from Old Spain, becauſe, while we have the Havanna, the Spaniſh merchant could expect no remittances of money, or other returns, unleſs from the South Seas, by the round-about way of Cape Horn, or from Buenos Aires. This way of coming at the treaſures of the Weſt-Indies would, in many reſpects, be much more to our advantage, as well as much more ſafe and certain, than getting their gold and ſilver mines into our hands. Let them always continue to work their mines, while they pay the produce to us.

The

The poſſeſſion of the Havannah will enable us only to render Louiſiana of no value to the French, but even to make them ſick of it, by preventing any intercourſe between it and Europe; and moreover to drive them out of it when we pleaſe, a point which to me ſeems of greater conſequence than is imagined by thoſe who report, or believe, that we are not only to give up Louiſiana to the French, but alſo to guaranty the enjoyment of it to them. Is it poſſible to think that our ſouthern colonies in North America, hedged in as they are by the fierceſt Indian tribes, can long remain in peace, tranquility or ſafety, if the French be ſuffered, be encouraged, to ſettle behind them, and to extend their plantations all over that vaſt tract of pleaſant, healthy, fertile country, which invites their reſidence in Louiſiana? Will they not of courſe debauch the Indians, and excite them to hoſtilities againſt the Britiſh ſubjects? which they will not find it difficult to bring about, eſpecially if their indefatigable miſſionaries ſucceed in converting thoſe Indians to popery. A celebrated miſſionary, in his account of Canada, hath adduced no leſs than ſixteen ſtrong reaſons to prove that it is impoſſible for the French to live in peace with the Engliſh, either on the ſame iſland or on the ſame continent; and as he knew them well, we may believe the character he gives of his countrymen, and take it for granted that they are every where the ſame. The opportunity therefore

therefore now given us of driving the French entirely out of Louiſiana, and thereby ſecuring the back frontiers of the Britiſh ſettlements, ſhould not, and, I perſuade myſelf will not, be neglected. For though our poſſeſſion of the Havannah will enable us at any time to chaſtiſe them, if they ſhould attempt to be troubleſome, yet it would be better to remove at once all occaſions of future broils. The ſame way of reaſoning leads me to urge, that inſtead of giving up the Havannah itſelf, we ought rather to make uſe of it as the immediate means of conquering the whole iſland of Cuba, which may eaſily be effected by ſending ſhips and troops from the Havanna to take the town of St. Jago, a place of no great ſtrength; the conſequence whereof would be the the adding to his Majeſty's dominions one of the largeſt, moſt beautiful, healthy, and fertile iſlands, in the world; where all the products of the Weſt Indies grow almoſt ſpontaneouſly: for in that caſe, every Spaniard on the iſland would be glad to ſubmit to the Britiſh Government, and we might with eaſe and ſecurity keep an undiſturbed poſſeſſion of the Havanna, and our garriſon be plentifully ſupplied with all manner of freſh proviſions, which muſt otherwiſe be fetched from the continent.

Nor is this the only utility to be derived from our conqueſt of Cuba: for without indulging the mere luſt of power, and a deſire of graſping at new acquiſitions, I think I can make it

 appear,

appear, that our preſent circumſtances and proſpects require ſuch an addition to our iſlands, in order not only to indemnify us for the great expence we have been forced into, by the Spaniſh injuſtice in commencing this war, but alſo to ſecure, in ſome meaſure, our other ſettlements, or commerce with them, and our naval ſuperiority, to France eſpecially, which wants nothing to compleat our ruin, but to beat us at ſea. I ſuppoſe it known then, that before the preſent war with France we exported no ſugars; that the whole produce of our ſugar-iſlands was conſumed by ourſelves; nay, that it was not ſufficient to anſwer our home conſumption; for that, though many French ſugars were fraudulently imported into England as the produce of our own iſlands, yet Ireland was ſtill forced to ſupply herſelf with large quantities of Brazil ſugars from Liſbon: that our colonies in North America were chiefly ſupplied with rum, molaſſes, and brown ſugar, from the French Iſlands. In the mean time the French have for many years ſupplied all the foreign markets with the commodity we we are ſpeaking of. Now, what our iſlands could not do before the war, certainly they will not be able to do after it; moreover, we have by the preſent war acquired a great additional number of ſubjects in North-America: the taſte for ſugar, and the conſumption of it, are increaſing daily in every part of Europe; ſo that in time the ſugar trade will be amazingly great;

great; and, if we reſtore Martinico, Guadalupe, &c. will be all in the hands of the French. The neceſſary conſequence will be, that this trade will prove a more prolific nurſery of ſeamen to the French, than even our favourite Newfoundland trade is to Britain. Is not this conſequence to be dreaded? Is not the event to be avoided, if poſſible, by ſecuring to ourſelves as much additional ſugar-land as may put us, at leaſt, on a par with the French, while we have it yet in our power, without invading the juſt rights of any one? The groundleſs and unjuſt war declared againſt us by Spain, gives us a fair title to indemnification at her coſt: for there will never be an end of injuſtice, if the agreſſor triumph always, either in his ſucceſs, or in his eſcape with impunity. And what meaſures can we take to puniſh Spain, and to indemnify ourſelves, better than by keeping the whole iſland of Cuba?*

It

* The citizens in their laſt addreſs ſeemed to have entered into the full ſpirit of this important ſentiment. They ſay, "May the poſſeſſion of this very valuable conqueſt, together "with other happy conſequences of your Majeſty's meaſures, "thus wiſely and vigorouſly purſued, prove the means of effectually defeating the ambitious views of your Majeſty's enemies, and of for ever diſſolving the late alarming compact of "the Houſe of Bourbon, calculated to deſtroy the commerce of "your ſubjects, and replete with danger to the exiſtence of your "Majeſty's ancient and natural ally, and to the independence of "the reſt of the powers of Europe. And we beg leave humbly "to aſſure your Majeſty, that your faithful citizens of London, "animated by the warmeſt ſenſe of duty to your Majeſty, and "their country, will, with unwearied chearfulneſs, contribute

their

It has been ſhewn that the Britiſh ſugar colonies were not capable of ſupplying the demand for home-conſumption before the war, and that they will much leſs be able to do ſo when a peace comes. It is ſaid indeed that we are to have the Neutral iſlands added to our ſugar-lands; but that is a mere trifle in compariſon of what will really be wanted to bring

" their utmoſt efforts to ſtrengthen your Majeſty's hands, until " your enemies, moved by their own repeated loſſes and diſtreſſes, " ſhall be diſpoſed to liſten to ſuch terms of accommodation, as " your royal wiſdom ſhall think adequate to our glorious ſuc- " ceſſes; and ſuch as may effectually ſecure the trade and navi- " gation of your ſubjects; and prevent the calamities of a fu- " ture war."

The calamities of a future war are what we have moſt to fear. An inglorious peace, like that of Aix la Chapelle, will ſoon bring on another war. The implacable hatred of France and Spain to us, is never to be eradicated: the deſigns of their family compact are to be our eternal enemies, and to open the way to the deſired haven of France, who aſpires at nothing leſs than *univerſal monarchy*; therefore unleſs we ſo annihilate the ſtrength of our enemies, as to break the deſigns of that compact, we ſhall never have " an equitable, glorious and laſting peace."

There is only one way to prevent another war, and that is, *keep all our conqueſts*; for, in plain terms, we muſt either do that, or by reſtoring them, put our enemies again into a condition of going to war with us in a very ſhort time; when, perhaps, the divine Providence may not be ſo favourable to our cauſe, ſince we held the former bleſſings in ſo low an eſtimation. How would every honeſt Engliſhman rejoiced to have ſeen, in the addreſs above quoted, a deſire or a wiſh that the Havannah might *never* be reſtored, but *annexed* to the crown of Great-Britain.—I aſk pardon of the gentlemen who drew it up for this preſumption; but doubtleſs they had their reaſons for not making uſe of ſuch an expreſſion: perhaps they thought it would look like *dictating*; but it was reported about the Exchange, three or four days before the addreſs appeared in the Gazette, that ſuch a glorious and patriotic ſentiment was *really* in it, and every man rejoiced to hear there was ſuch a ſpirit in the city of London.—I am diſappointed.

bring us near a par with our rivals. The French would ſtill be ſuperior to us (if Martinico, Guadalupe, and Marigalante be reſtored to them) even if we had Cuba itſelf. For San Domingo, and the other French iſlands, would yield much more and better ſugar than all the Britiſh iſlands, with the addition of the Neutral iſlands and Cuba too. Beſides that, many years muſt paſs, a great deal of labour and much expence muſt be employed, before any of thoſe iſlands could be cultivated for the production of ſugars; and all that while the French would no doubt be buſily employed in extending their ſugar plantations, in San Domingo eſpecially. So that at the beſt it would be very long before we could pretend to vie with them at the markets in Europe, eſpecially as they live, work, and ſail much cheaper than we can.

This being the caſe, it certainly behoves us to make the moſt prudent uſe of thoſe advantages which the good providence of God, favouring the juſtice of our cauſe, hath put into our hands.

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When once we are afraid to ſpeak, we are no longer ſafe. TRENCHARD.

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☞ The Authors of the CRITICAL REVIEW of laſt Month ſpeak thus of this Pamphlet: "A Series of irre-"fragable Arguments againſt making Peace with our "Enemies, until we have deprived *France* and *Spain* of "every Foot of Land they poſſeſs on the Continent of "*America* and in the *Weſt-Indies*, &c."